Environmental Policy


Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles


Governing Oligopolies: Global Regimes and Market Structure” 2016. Global Environmental Politics 16(3): 106-126.

Abstract: Historically, governments have adopted legalized, integrated, and global rules to govern oligopolistic industries, such as shipping, chemicals, and industrial production. By contrast, they have adopted non-binding and un-integrated rules and institutions to govern competitive industries such as energy, agriculture, and mining at national or sub-national scales. Considering that competitive producers face greater barriers to political collective action, what explains the form of global governance across these sectors? This article demonstrates that oligopolistic producers are more intensively and extensively regulated than competitive markets because producers in oligopolistic industries can more cost-effectively alter markets to meet environmental goals. Therefore, despite their political influence, oligopolies are regularly called upon to initiate and sustain market transformation on a global scale. New qualitative evidence from two treaty regimes governing different types of markets support this theory, as well as new quantitative data on the full range of global environmental treaty regimes since World War II.  

Presented at Duke University, the University of California at Santa Barbara, the University of Massachusetts Boston, the University of Colorado Boulder, the University of Georgia, and the 2013, 2014, and 2015 Annual Conventions of the International Studies Association. 


"Regional Water Cooperation: Creating Incentives for Integrated Management” 2016. Journal of Conflict Resolution 60(6): 1041-1070.

Abstract: Shared water has prompted some neighboring countries to form integrated regional institutions and rules. Other neighboring countries have maintained less cooperative policies in managing shared water. When do governments achieve integrated management of regional water? How do they overcome barriers to integrated cooperation? This paper contends that the structure of interdependence, not the number of states bordering the water, encourages different international policies. It analyzes original panel data on the agreement histories of 76 rivers, lakes, and seas. It also examines the role of selective incentives in promoting mutual water management. Fundamentally, the number of states with access to the water does not determine the fate of water management. Strategies for overcoming divergent preferences can be applied across situations. The key is to provide selective incentives when states are asymmetrically interdependent in using the water, to alter national preferences. Selective incentives are particularly important when few states share the water. 

Presented at the 2012 Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, the 2012 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, and the 2013 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association.


The Global Climate Regime: Explaining Lagging Reform” 2014. Review of Policy Research 31(3): 173-198.

Abstract: There has been growing demand for reform of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to meet the demands for action on climate change. How have governments met the demand for action on climate change despite the lagging pace of UNFCCC reform? New qualitative data demonstrate that the institutional, sectoral, and technical aspects of international institutions have guided government choices in managing climate change issues. Institutional resources and sectoral participation in multilateral institutions have enabled governments to handle climate change issues outside the UNFCCC, reducing the need to invest in its reform as demand for action has grown. These specialized institutions are able to mitigate political disputes and facilitate greater efficacy in handling specific issues such as financing and emissions mitigation. They have mandates that overlap with the cross-cutting agenda of climate change governance, requiring no new mandates, which mitigates potential political disputes.

Presented at the 2012 Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association and the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (cancelled).


Work in Progress


“Opposing Frames in the Fracking Debate: A National Survey Experiment” (with Patrick Bayer)

Funded by Resources for the Future (Washington, DC)


“Does Institutionalized Cooperation Help to Promote Peace after War: An Empirical Analysis of River Basin Cooperation”

Presented at the 2015 and 2016 Annual Conventions of the International Studies Association and the 2015 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association


“The Tragedy of the Commons in California: Modest Proposals"


Invited Publications


"Danube River Cooperation in Comparative Perspective" Danube Watch. 2/2013. Published by the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (Vienna, Austria)